Cybersecurity and International Law: Charting Stability in the Black Sea–Eastern Mediterranean Region

Abstract

In an era of geopolitical flux, cyberattacks have become a new battleground that intertwines state security with private life. The Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean regions have seen aggressive cyber and electronic operations (e.g. satellite-navigation jamming of commercial vessels) used to advance strategic aims. Such stealthy conflict —from critical-infrastructure intrusions to disinformation campaigns— test the limits of existing international law. These threats often evade easy attribution and fall below the threshold of traditional armed conflict, challenging states' ability to respond. Under current public international law (the UN Charter and Geneva Conventions), the use of force is broadly prohibited, and civilian harm must be minimized. International law is incoherent with the dominance of non-state actors (hackers, firms, etc.) in cyberspace and thus has no teeth against digital aggression. The result is routine noncompliance with little accountability, which erodes trust in institutions and norms. This paper's central research question asks: can international law, as currently structured, effectively constrain cyber aggression and preserve stability in the Black Sea–Eastern Mediterranean (region), or are new legal frameworks required? The paper addresses this through a doctrinal analysis of treaties, UN resolutions, North Atlantic Treaty Organization/European Union declarations, and state cyber doctrines. The study suggests that bridging the cyber gaps is crucial to reinforcing the rule of law and preventing the erosion of international order. In the Black Sea–Eastern Mediterranean region, strengthening cyber norms would help sustain social cohesion and uphold political credibility during crises.